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 Should philosophy revise its own theories in the light of new scientific facts ? 
Although philosophers do not all agree on a positive response, naturalist 
philosophers consider that no good philosophy can be built upon outdated science. 
This is not to say that philosophy can be reduced to science.  Whereas scientists are 
dealing with facts, philosophers have primarily  conceptual duties - with the 
correlative obligations for keeping an eye on possible worlds,   theoretical 
alternatives and questions left unexplored by empirical investigation. Philosophy 
occupies a notoriously difficult position : while it should extend its conceptual 
considerations to non-realised possibilities, it should still be attentive to facts, in the 
sense that a conceptual analysis incompatible with empirical data cannot claim to be 
adequate. 
One of the clearest cases of an outdated philosophical claim is offered by 
substance dualism, which considers mind and body as two distinct entities with 
different causal capacities, a view that neuroscience has made increasingly difficult 
to sustain. Other dualism-related philosophical claims have been shown to rely on 
untenable scientific tenets; the notion that consciousness  can be understood as 
some central function enjoying some unified perspective on the mental processing 
(Dennett, 1993), and preparing in a chronologically anterior session all the relevants 
steps in decision and action (Libet, 1985).  In  these and similar cases, it appears in 
retrospect that modern and contemporary philosophy have unduly taken folk 
psychology  at face value. 
The present paper will concentrate on one of the domains in which contemporary 
neuroscience seriously upsets the picture offered jointly by folk psychology, 
traditional philosophy and even not so distant experimental psychology, namely 
action, its representation and its relationships with other mental functions. Until 
recently, philosophers of mind considered that the motor part in action did not 
intrinsically belong to the mental domain.  In the dualist tradition, the faculty of 
understanding defined the mind, whereas the faculty of moving deliberately, i.e. of 
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executing the decisions taken at a cognitive level, was considered a lower-level 
bodily function1. Executing was not seen as requiring per se anything like specific 
representations of the environment and of the body; more exactly, motor behavior 
appeared to rely on perceptual and conceptual processing that was independently 
effected upstream. Classical psychology also assumed that motor output would 
simply use perceptual information collected, so to speak, in a more or less 
speculative, "all-purpose" way. One of the corollaries of this claim was that 
particular motor outputs had no privileged relation with given perceptual inputs; 
being non-cognitive, motor coding was considered to be neutral on the issue of 
sensory representations;  in other words, there was  in this perspective no such 
thing as classes of movements being more readily accessible given certain classes of 
sensory input, over and above  the associations between stimuli and responses that  
learning allows establishing.   
Philosophy of mind, as well as philosophy of action, have been deeply influenced 
by the view according to which cognition is mainly "input related". All major 
philosophers of perception analyzed perception as having to do with objects and 
events in the  outer world. The view of perception as a detached form of sensory 
access to the external world is currently challenged by a set of neuro-physiological 
findings. Ungerleider & Mishkin's  1982 theory of the "two cortical visual systems" 
suggested that two types of neurons are involved in vision. While an occipito-
temporal system is involved in object-recognition and semantic association of visual 
characteristics, a parieto-frontal system is specializing in visuomotor control; 
according to this analysis, visual neurons in the dorsal stream  mostly respond   to 
"where" questions, while those in the ventral stream   mostly answer  "what" 
questions. This theory was later refined in different ways2. Of particular interest is 
the observation that the dorsal system includes in turn two distinct ways of coding 
that are directly correlated with representing action-related properties (Jeannerod, 
1997). Spatial properties that are extracted through perception are either "intrinsic"  
or "extrinsic" (or relational)  object properties. The first ones are examplified by 
shape and size; they determine the characteristics of the motion that are involved in 
                                                
1 See in this respect Missa's rebuttal of Bergson's  view of action as a non-
representational cerebral function in Missa (1997). 
2In particular, Zeki (1993) insisted that the relevant distinction was not so much 
between object related properties, on the one hand, and spatial properties, on 
the other, as between two different ways of extracting forms ; the ventral one 
extracting form and color, and the dorsal one extracting form in motion. But 
this analysis was still mostly "vision oriented". Even though it did emphasize 
the role of the dorsal system in visuomotor transformations, it was still 
grounded in the notion that visual representation is organized though 
modalities having to do with visual coding.  
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grasping an object. The second, like location in space (represented in egocentric 
coordinates), or motion dynamics, are characteristics involved in reaching  towards 
an object. 
These results suggest that philosophers of perception may have been biased in 
several ways in analyzing perception. First,  perception is far from being a passive 
registering of external properties, objects and events, contrary to a common 
philosophical view; it seems to involve some kind of precategorization of 
perceptual content; to perceive is to represent something as being somewhere, and 
as affording some kind of movement.  Such a tacit categorical knowledge is  
displayed in the interactions of the perceiver with the world, for example through 
the various anticipations that attentional mechanisms provide. Secondly, perception 
involves a complex interplay between egocentric and allocentric data. Philosophers 
absorbed into externalist views on perceptual content may have to refine their 
approach in order to encompass the full range of perceptual operations. 
One further important consequence of this and other neurophysiological findings 
is that philosophers now have new tasks regarding the analysis of action itself.  
Standard philosophical definitions of action explain it in terms of some reason to act 
which causes a  relevant bodily movement. In this vein, Davidson (1980)  holds that 
a proattitude relative to some state of affairs, in combination with the relevant 
belief that such and such a movement would bring about the desired condition, 
produces causally the instrumental movement. Thus the reason to act is both a 
justification of an action, and the cause of the corresponding physical behavior. What 
is questionable in this analysis is not that reasons to act should be instrumental in 
producing the external movement; although Wittgensteinian philosophers insist 
that any conflation between causation and rationality is a philosophical confusion of 
the "grammatical" variety, many philosophers take the causal role of reasons to be 
a necessary  precondition for an intentional action; how good would be the 
Aristotelian practical syllogism if it was denied any neuronal realization? The 
problem is rather that this type of analysis does not address at all the question of 
how this realization could proceed, and even seems to defy any plausible solution. 
Once the action schema is taken to include  propositional attitude contents, on the 
one hand, and a physical movement, i.e. a motor event, on the other hand, it is not 
clear how the gap between world-directed intentional contents and motor 
execution could ever be bridged, which in turn opens new concerns about the so-
called problem of deviant causal chains3.   
                                                
3A second problem, to which I will return later, is that such an analysis ignores 
a wide category of actions that are not performed "for a reason", on the basis of 
a set of appropriate beliefs and desires. This second problem will be dealt with 
below. 
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The problem of deviant causal chains consists in the fact that the intentional 
content of an action can be brought about causally by the agent in some 
unintentional way. One of the classical examples is the case of a nephew who drives 
to his uncle's home in order to kill him with a gun, and out of nervosity runs over a 
pedestrian who happens to be his uncle4. There is actually a causal link between the 
reason to act and the physical behavior leading to the outcome, but that causal link 
does not qualify as the right one, for it is not part of the intended relation between 
action and outcome. One cannot, by definition, try to perform an action by using 
some non-controllable kind of movement. Nervosity is clearly failing to qualify as a 
rational means to reach the intended end. This kind of external factor of deviance 
can clearly be matched by internal factors, where some inappropriate cerebral 
condition releases a motor program that  should have been inhibited, given the 
present motivational states of the subject, and that leads to a movement 
inappropriately caused, and therefore not properly intentional. An example of a 
deviant internal causal factor  is offered by the case of a person X who wants to tell 
the truth to Y about some  fact, and tells it when intoxicated by alcohol instead of 
doing it in a controlled manner. 
Although Davidson has his own reasons for doubting that the problem of deviant 
causal chains can be solved at all,5 a philosopher may want to resist them and 
imagine various ways to address this difficulty. One consists in asking the agent's  
confirmation that such and such a causal chain was (or failed to be) part of his 
intentions. But as Ogien (1997) notes rightly, one cannot rely on the agent's 
appreciation of his action - as to whether it was  rightly caused - without 
recognizing the incompleteness of the above analysis in terms of mental states. 
Indeed one of the interesting features of Davidson's analysis of action is that the 
agent is not  himself causal in an action, which allows a finer-grained analysis of 
action causation.  
It should further be stressed that, when one speaks of mental causation, the  
agent's report on which mental states are actually causal may be unilluminating, 
insofar as the agent is in no way an infaillible judge about why he did what he did. 
Empirical data tend to show that subjects have no priviledged access to the mental 
states that are causal in their own decision to act6. This should not lead to deny that 
something like the mental-states causation picture is right, but simply to 
acknowledge that the reasons which the agent gives for his own actions may not 
always  be the ones that were instrumental in producing the action. 
                                                
4 Cf. Searle (1983), 82, and  Chisholm (1966), 37. 
5 His reasons have to do with his refusal of psycho-physical laws ; cf. Davidson 
(1980), 80. 
6 See Nisbett & Wilson (1977). 
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Another perhaps more promising way, consists in providing an analysis of 
intentional action that bridges the gap between intention to act and execution of the 
relevant action, in a way that clarifies the causal contribution of the intention in the 
actual movement. This kind of analysis has been attempted both by neuroscientists 
and by philosophers  trying to bring neurophysiology to bear on the problem of 
action causation.7 
The general idea is that the crucial factor that explains how an action can be 
normally caused by some prior  or occurrent intention is  the existence of some 
unique set of pragmatic rules -also called motor representations - that build up and 
control the formation and the execution of intentions to act. Clearly, the very 
existence of a jointly representational and  executive medium would make the 
question of deviant causal chains more tractable. The data unfortunately do not 
warrant such a uniform view on action. There are at least two distincts types of 
action codes8. One describes the action in allocentric, relatively abstract and general 
terms ; it can be consciously accessed and memorized, and can be also expressed 
verbally; it is the semantic dimension of action, that involves long-term associative 
memory. The other code represents the action in an egocentric way. It is usually  
rapidly forgotten, and if not entirely implicit, it often defies precise verbal 
expression. At first blush, neurophysiological two-tiered construction of  action has 
to solve a  problem similar to the problem of deviant causation which  philosophical 
analyses have raised : how could potentially incommensurate representational 
formats  be connected in order to produce a unique goal-directed behavior ? In the 
present paper, I will present three elements that both offer  a solution of these two 
closely related problems and qualify as constituents of  the very concept of an 
action: 1) a movement must be regulated by feedback to qualify as an action ; 2)  
some historical-teleological connection must be present to achieve the connection 
between pragmatic and semantic aspects of the action ; 3) finally, an action involves 
crucially the extended use of deictic reference. 
 
1- Feedback 
 
The concept of feedback  in the philosophy of action has been used against  the 
traditional view according to which an agent accomplishes successfully an action 
only if he is able beforehand to represent in detail all the relevant aspects of its 
interaction with the environment9.  This traditional view presents the difficulty that 
                                                
7 See Bach, (1978), Jeannerod (1994), Livet (1994, 1996, 1997),  Pacherie (1997a), 
(1997b), (1998a), (1998b), Proust (1996, 1998). 
8 See Jeannerod (1994) et (1997). 
9See Livet (1994) 
 31 Août 1998 - Indexes for action 
6 
the subject is supposed to be able to act thanks to some retrospective influence  of 
the goal on the action under development, i.e.  by way of some so-called "final 
cause". The first attempt at showing that  the concept of a goal-oriented behavior 
can be analysed without having to use any final causation can be found in 
Rosenblueth,Wiener and Bigelow's  classical 1943 paper. They suggest that a goal-
oriented behavior can be realized mechanically (i.e. by a purely physical system) if 
only the system can receive and use a negative feedback "from the goal". The 
notion of feedback generally requires that a system turns part of its output into an 
input;  one speaks ofnegative feedback when the signals involving the target 
constrain the output in order to reduce the error  between the target location and 
the current trajectory.  
Presence of feedback is often considered a central piece in the definition of 
action10. Now there are different ways in which this kind of feedback may be 
involved in action. These different views do not respond in the same way to the 
problem of deviant causal chains. An inflow version  is exemplified by  Pierre 
Livet's initial 1994 model. An explanation that radically eliminates finalism from 
action theory should according to Livet put  all the burden of the intentional 
dynamics on  feedback. In such a theory, the target, i.e. the final state of the system  
is the only element that needs to be represented (in egocentric coordinates). The  
movement develops from a weak initial constraint to a sequence of corrections - by 
negative feedback -  that bring the organism to the target location. In this kind of 
explanation, feedback is temporally coincident with intentional behavior, while 
looking ahead - or anticipating the result - is confined to the activation of the 
representation of a final state.  
Still this representation does not work as a final cause. In such a model,  the 
causation of action involves both goal representation and  the inflow sensory 
feedback about local dynamics relative to goal. As Pierre Livet emphasizes, it is 
only when the course of action is corrected  that the agent discovers his own intention  
(Livet, 1997, 346). In this way, the chances for an action causal chain to be deviant 
are reduced by the fact that the actual course is recognized as constituting the 
corresponding intention. If the action is defined only by its actual corrective 
procedure, then there should be no discrepancy between intentional and  efficient 
causation. A failure in feedback operation should activate an interruption of the 
course of action, and a recognition that its conditions of satisfaction failed to be met. 
However it may be objected that  in this analysis the gap between the goal 
realization and the sequence of corrections is not bridged, but only displaced. For if 
the only information represented beforehand is the target event, one can think of 
                                                
10See among  others Sommerhoff (1990), Livet (1994) et (1997), Proust (1997).  
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deviant circumstances that allow the motor intention to develop in the course of a 
corrective procedure, with an effect that is mistakenly taken to be the realization of 
the goal. As far as the goal representation is not instrumental in the correction 
procedure, the two intentions may well fail to converge, given the strong drives 
that may be exerted on the system by interfering stimuli. Indeed the very 
coincidence between intended effect and observed effect in a particular action 
seems  in this analysis to be a miracle. The possibility that the action reaches its 
success conditions through non-intentional, causally deviant means is left fully 
open11. 
 
What is needed is a closer link between action-monitoring and goal-
representation. Another view on the role of feedback turns this link into a 
constitutive relation in which the goal controls the feedback at each step. This view 
consists in making  feedback subordinate to the representation of a central command 
allowing predictions in sensory reafferences. It is articulated in Arbib's model for a 
"coordinated control program", containing perceptual and motor schemas, as well 
as feedback loops between sensory input and schema assemblage. (Arbib, 1990). It 
has also been developed in connection with neurophysiological data in a series of  
works by Jeannerod and his collaborators. (Jeannerod, 1994, Jeannerod, 1997). 
In contradistinction with the preceding theory, feedback is not only provided by 
the peripheral senses, but is also internally fed under the anticipatory monitoring of 
a central command, the feedforward signal. Internal information about expected 
input at each stage of action is  directly provided to the relevant sensory structures 
at a central level. A comparison can thus be effected on line between the steps 
towards the desired goal and the action being executed. Neurophysiological 
evidence brings support to the hypothesis that such a functional organization could 
allow a much  quicker and more flexible capacity for adapted action than some 
version of purely external feedback. The concepts of corollary discharge12 and of  
efferent copy13 both express the same crucial idea: the brain sends signals that allow 
keeping track of its own commands and uses them to compare   outflow information 
(commands issued and sensory predictions) and inflow information (sensory 
reafferences)14.  
Feedback is thus now understood in a very different way. A system first 
generates predictions on the basis of the command issued, (on the basis of earlier 
                                                
11 For an interesting comment  on and reevaluation of Livet (1994), see Livet 
(1997). 
12 Sperry (1950) 
13 Von Holst & Mittelstaedt (1950) 
14 See Jeannerod (1997) for a detailed analysis. 
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actions and their stored cue-effect pairs), then compares its predictions with actual 
reafferences.  Feedback is for this reason considered "internal". This model explains 
both how feedback can be used without delaying performance, and how motor 
trajectories are designed by feedforward very early in the course of a simple action, 
such as a grasping. It has been shown, for example, that the hand is preshaped, 
early in the movement, in a way adapted to the shape of the target. (Jeannerod & 
Biguer, 1982).  
 
This decisive notion of a command-based control allows explaining in part how 
causation can proceed smoothly from preparation to execution. Nevertheless it 
remains to be explained how motor control per se can be linked to the semantics of 
action, which is the crucial element for deviant causal chains. As we saw earlier, 
deviant causation threatens when there is no nomological link between intending 
to effect P and effecting P. We just bridged the gap between intending P and doing 
the motor act towards P. The problem now is to bridge the remaining gap between 
doing the motor act towards P and realizing P. How is it at all possible that this 
particular movement is done as part of that particular action ? Given that there 
exists apparently an infinite number of possible movements compatible with a 
particular action, there seems to be no causal link that could warrant the unicity of 
the action considered semantically, i.e.  through its intentional content, and the 
action considered motorically, i.e.  through its pragmatic content. 
 
2 - Schema selection 
 
Philosophers have frequently observed that an action can be given a variety of 
descriptions that are all consonant with the intentional content of the action. 
Feinberg called it "the accordion effect". John Searle  illustrates this effect through 
the example of Gavrilo Princip's murder of Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo: 
" Of Princip we say that he: (1) pulled the trigger, (2) fired the gun, (3) shot the 
Archduke, (4) struck a blow against Austria, (5) avenged Serbia"15. In other words, 
one can distinguish the basic action, i.e. the bodily movement effected with a given 
intention, from its results. Among those,  some  are actually part of the semantic 
content of the action, such as items (3-4-5) in the accordion above; other results of 
the action are part of its pragmatic content, such as pulling the trigger. The accordion 
effect reflects the fact that a basic action, defined as a bodily movement executed in 
virtue of a certain set of beliefs and desires, has many different results ; among 
them, holds a link which can be causal (such as 1-2-3) or conceptual (such as 3-4). 
                                                
15Searle (1983), 98. 
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The intentional results are those that are in a means-end relationship, whereas the 
non-intentional ones are results that are no part of the conditions of satisfaction of 
the action. 
Philosophers have entertained different views on how many actions are 
performed in the list above. While  Goldman16 considers that the list represents an 
"action tree", i.e. a complex of actions, each one being individuated by its relevant 
property (e.g. effecting a trigger-pulling vs effecting a gun-firing), Davidson defines 
the action as the bodily movement that is directly caused by the corresponding 
mental states. According to Davidson, all the above characterizations of Gavrilo 
Princip's murdering of the Archduke refer to the same action defined as a bodily 
event, although they offer various properties to describe it.  "We never do more 
than moving our bodies : the rest is up to nature."17 
One way of rephrasing the problem of causal deviance at this stage of our 
reflection is to try to clarify what exactly constrains the relationship between 
pragmatic and semantic contents of an action. John Searle18 solves the related 
problem of how to assemble the prior intention with the intention in action by 
invoking a common  feature of them both : they are self-referential, which helps the 
causal link to develop in the  intended manner from prior intention to bodily  
movement. The prior intention is self-referential in the sense that its content is that 
"itself be causally efficacious in producing the intended outcome",  and the intention 
in action is self-referential in the sense that it expresses the requirement that itself 
should be causal in the bodily movement. According to Searle, the following clause 
expresses the content of the total intention to act : 
 
(I)  that this prior intention causes  [this intention in action causes  this 
bodily movement]. 
 
In Searle's view, this content of the intentional content of an action must be fully 
grasped by an agent if it is to count as this agent's intention;  further, it constitutes 
the corresponding conscious experience of acting. These two claims have raised a 
number of objections, among which I will select the following three19. 1) Should the 
awareness to act intentionally   depend on the grasp of embedded self-referentiality 
of intentions?  2) Is it plausible to require from this grasp that it capture the 
causative relation between the two kinds of intentions, thereby excluding non 
linguistic animals and human infants - beings who presumably lack concepts of 
                                                
16  Goldman, (1970). 
17 Davidson, (1980), 59. 
18 Searle, (1983), pp. 93 sq. 
19 See Bach, (1978), Armstrong, (1991),  Pacherie, (1998b). 
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intentions, of causality, or of both - from the range of intentional action?  3) Finally, 
should the conscious attempt to act determine the range of actions in general ?  
Many actions seem to be performed by  an agent without any kind of conscious 
intentional content. If this is so, how are intentions in action to be distinguished 
from bodily behaviors of the deviant kind ?   
I want to suggest that a negative answer should be offered to questions 2 and 3, 
while   taking  a positive stance towards the first: I will defend the view that  self-
referentiality is indeed an essential component of  awareness of acting intentionally 
(as well as of acting tout court). Although such a view is by no means original (see 
Pacherie, 1998), it has been associated with the claim  that action has to be 
consciously initiated or performed to count as intentional. I will on the contrary 
recognize with other authors (Bach, 1978, Frankfurt, 1988) that some actions, which 
Bach calls "minimal", are performed unthinkingly, automatically, routinely, and 
even in ways that are controlled by the environment and not by the agent's 
conscious or unconscious will. Such a recognition seems to be consonant with 
neuroscientific and neuropsychological approaches of action, as numerous actions 
in humans and non-humans are found to be triggered not by an antecedent 
intention, nor by what Searle calls an intention in action, but by the simple 
perception of some relevant stimulus20. 
 
If  our concept of action is  to include minimal actions, our concept of intention 
must itself be correspondingly generalized by allowing "minimal intentions". Any 
motivating property, be it a reason to act or some external  stimulus poised to 
"drive behavior" could in principle constitute an intention to act. As this  use of the 
term may be found counterintuitive, I will simply replace it, in claim I above, with 
the corresponding type of representation at work: 
 
I': that this semantic representation of action A causes  [this pragmatic 
representation of action causes   this bodily movement]. 
 
We are thus left with two difficulties. 1) How are we to understand the role that 
the term "causes" plays in determining the intentional content of an action in a way 
that does not  require that the intentional content depend on grasping the concept of 
a cause ? 2) How is self-referentiality able to glue together, so to speak, both types 
of action representations, i.e. the semantic and the pragmatic ? 
 
 
                                                
20 James, (1890), Frith, (1992), Berthoz, (1997). 
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The first element of a solution of how an intentional action can include causality 
without that causal link between the semantic  and the pragmatic  representations  
being explicitly represented in the intentional content resides in the historical-
teleological aspect of action. A classical explanation for the association between goal 
representation and movement execution has been offered by the "action-effect 
principle", developed by James and Lotze, and is now inspiring, if I am not 
mistaken,  in one form or another, the work of many contemporary theorists of 
action, among whom  Berthoz,  Jeannerod21 and Prinz22.  According to this 
principle, an action is acquired, planned, and controlled in terms of its effects. As we 
saw earlier, feedback from the effects can be stored centrally and used in 
determining further courses of action. As the distal effects coincide with the external 
outcome of the action, it is through the semantic properties of the action (that it has 
such and such a consequence on the perceived external world) that an action is 
represented and stored. Lower-level pragmatic representations are thus 
subsequently  activated by the "higher-order" goal.  
Jeannerod offers as an illustration of this regimentation of pragmatic concepts 
under semantically defined action concepts with an experiment by Marteniuk et al. 
(1987), in which subjects have to reach for a disc in two conditions : either they  
have to fit it into a box ; or they have to throw it23. What is found is that the subjects 
have a slower reach movement and a longer phase of deceleration  in the first 
condition, which can only be explained by the characteristics of the ulterior part of 
the action. The pragmatic representation seems thus to be under the  selective 
control of some final goal, as predicted by the action-effect principle24. Some neural 
cells in the premotor cortex seem indeed specialized in coding a movement for a 
certain goal, whether performed by the agent or by another person25. This principle 
can be applied not only to simple sequences of action, but to more complex action-
plans that introduce a succession of hierarchical constrains on nested goals of a 
more and more concretely determined variety. 
The action-effect principle is certainly of heuristic value, even though it may   
appear too crude in the formulation given above: the action-effect principle as 
stated is indeed clearly applicable only in the case when an action can be repeated 
from the same initial  to the same final positions. But such a situation is certainly the 
                                                
21 A difference between their theories that needs not concern us here bears 
upon the role of internal vs external feedback in the effects of an action. 
22 See Prinz (1997) & Hommel (1997). 
23 Jeannerod (1997), 126. 
24 Fuster (1995) shows the role of  two sets of overlapping prefrontal networks 
representing  respectively the  sensory cue  and the motor response (cf. 179 sq). 
25 Di Pellegrino et al., 1992. 
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exception, given that the agent moves his body and changes his dynamic 
properties, and that the target event may also have variable kinematic and other 
physical and motivational properties. The principle of action-effect has to be 
completed by a specification of how the optimal trajectories given the target 
location and the biomechanical constraints can be learnt. Such a specification 
involves a simulation of an action and a comparison  between object position coded 
in extrinsic coordinates and hand location coded in intrinsic coordinates. Principles 
of optimization should be used by the system to select the most adequate 
pragmatic representation for the represented goal. Whatever refinements can be 
brought to the action-effect principle,  the latter allows explaining in non-final terms 
how, in Prinz's words, "the idea of a movement could bring about the realization of 
that movement"26. 
 
For philosophers, the interest of the empirical solution described in the "action-
effect principle" terminology is that it can be redescribed in a more abstract way 
which reveals the teleological  structure of this theory. To be able to do  X in order to 
get some desired result P it must be the case that : 
(1)  in the past, tokenings of X produced randomly  P in P'-motivated contexts , 
(2)  the very fact that former tokenings of X produced P caused a new token of X 
to be activated in new P'-motivated contexts. 
In the above analysis, P' is the motivational cue that is present when X is first 
effected, with the result of obtaining a motivationally adequate outcome P. For 
example, let us suppose that some hunger state obtains, and that some movement 
X is executed in a random way in presence of food, satisfying the need of the 
hungry animal. A side result of this initial  sequence is that in similar motivational 
contexts (hunger), the pragmatic representation  of mouth opening will be more 
likely to be activated, causing in turn the corresponding movement. 
This first step allows explaining how beliefs and desires, or in the generalized 
view, semantic representations, can become efficient in causing  a bodily movement. 
The answer is that the  corresponding pragmatic representation has been initially 
learnt as a means to reach an end, which allows later to solve the so-called "inverse 
problem" of which means has to be realized for an end to be reached. Schema 
selection results from the above association between  motivational context, and 
pragmatic concept activation. 
It also explains some important fact about intentions and semantic representations 
of actions, i.e. their normative character. An intention to act does  not only entertain 
causal,  but also normative   relations relations with its effects, in the sense that some 
                                                
26Prinz, (1994), 218. 
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outcome  is supposed to happen as part of the very etiological causation of the 
relevant bodily movement. Not only is this outcome the one "desired" or "willed" 
by the agent that performs the action ; it is also an outcome that is part of the 
history  of the present action. As Millikan (1993) has convincingly shown, 
normativity supervenes on evolutionary explanations of the presence of a token. 
Once some replication mechanism insures that some element can be copied when it 
has been helpful to the organism's survival,  the copied element can be evaluated 
for the contribution that it is supposed to make to the welfare of the organism in 
virtue of its belonging to its particular type. In the  case of action, replication is the 
result of learning ; obviously, the tokening of the representation of the whole 
action sequence depends functionally on some prior success rate of the 
corresponding type of representation. Normativity is a  pervasive characteristic of 
action : not only is a bodily movement caused by prior learning ; the system 
anticipates the reafferences, and, in Anokhin's terms, "approves" the correct 
development of action on the basis of expected sensory feedback.27 
The action-effect principle thus explains the causal mechanism in virtue of which a 
semantic and a pragmatic representation can become associated when two neural  
configurations become co-activated by learning. Once such an association is 
established, it allows  the agent to know  at least roughly how to proceed.  
Therefore, the agent does not have to represent such a causal mechanism as part of 
his intentional content for the action to unfold in a goal directed way28. 
We are now ready to confront the second problem raised above. How is self-
referentiality able to glue together, so to speak, both types of action 
representations, i.e. the semantic and the pragmatic ? Searle's analysis above 
suggested that self-referentiality was a crucial element in the solution. But  how can  
                                                
 27 See Berthoz (1997), 17 sqq. 
28Pacherie (1998) offers an alternative analysis of pragmatic representations that 
has interesting features in common with the present action-effect principle. She 
suggests that pragmatic representations treat objects as causally indexical, (like 
"easy to handle with one hand"). The term of  "causal indexicality", borrowed 
from Campbell (1993), refers to the fact  that specific  objects are treated as 
affordances, i.e. as  goals-for-me, by a motivated organism. Causal indexicals as 
understood by Campbell can thus be viewed as egocentrically determined 
functional entitities, i.e. correlates of possible goal-directed behaviors, whose 
functional relevance is learnt through the organism's antecedent activity. They 
allow, just as the action-effect principle does, to acknowledge  practical grasp of 
the object's value for action without involving any conceptual understanding of 
what grounds the success of the action. Although the action-effect principle fails 
to match the linguistic elegance of causal indexicality, the latter fails to explain 
how an organism acquires the practical knowledge of how to use this or that 
object given some current needs.   
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such a self-referentiality be realized in non-linguistic animals or in minimal actions ? 
More exactly, how can it be realized in  terms that do not involve, circularly, the 
perspective of a conscious agent ?   
 
3 - Monitoring of action, deicting binding and self-referentiality. 
 
One tempting way of explaining why a self-referential analysis of the intentional 
content of an action solves the problem of deviant causation consists in the 
following scenario, close to Searle's,  of what it is like to act. The agent should, while 
acting,  in substance think : "this goal [or semantic representation of the action] of 
mine, G, is currently being achieved by my A-ing", where "my A-ing" refers to 
some particular current activation of a pragmatic representation. The co-
instanciation of the same  anchoring (my willing G, my doing A) seems sufficient to 
warrant an adequate causal connection between both types of representations for 
the same action. 
However common-sensical, this analysis raises several difficulties. First,  as 
Pacherie (1998) correctly observes, the above analysis has to be completed with a 
demonstration that this token of willing is causally involved in this token of doing. It 
could well happen that the agent lost track of time, and mixes up two different 
successive attempts at performing an action. This is the problem of the temporal 
binding of the two representational components of an action.  
Second, it can very well be that introspection simply cannot give us the leverage 
on what the right link between the two representations are. We saw above that the 
agent's grasp of the causal link between the two representational aspects of his 
action plays no crucial role in the existence of that causal link.  The agent has, in 
ordinary circumstances, a unitary experience of doing one thing -- illuminating the 
room; not the experience of doing one thing by doing another -- illuminating the 
room in virtue of pressing a switch. His learning of the causal link may be entirely 
implicit, and develop in the absence of any concept of the relevant properties 
involved in the successful performance of his action, whether in the external world 
or in his own body. In a similar way, the agent could simply miss the crucial 
elements involved in his action representations. 
Still one could insist that the agent knows that he does this now in order to reach G 
because he entertains some conscious mental state that guides his action from 
planning to final execution. This is the strategy that Pacherie (1997) and (1998) uses 
to forbid wayward causation of action.  In her model, the relevant mental state for 
causal self-referentiality is offered by motor imagery: 
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 "The motor image provides the organism with an awareness of what is 
intended and with a conscious grasp of his body as generator of acting 
forces". (22).  
 
A motor image indeed concentrates the two kinds of information accessible in a 
self-centered way, whose conjunction seems to provide a solution to our deviant 
causation problem : one is a determined, conscious representation of the final state 
to reach; the other is what the agent currently feels as his own dynamical progress 
towards that state. Binding over time and binding  means with ends is achieved in 
this theory by making  self-representations explicit at these two crucial 
representational levels.  
However elegant and well-thought, this theory  raises several difficulties. One 
forceful objection against the view that conscious access to one's own performance 
can deflect any deviance in causal links consists in the fact that the agent may have 
illusions of agency29. He may believe wrongly that a certain motor image is what 
allows him to act (for example, as dance teachers know well,  he may have in mind 
the motor image of, say, a pas de bourrée, and execute in fact something quite 
different). He may also believe wrongly that he acts at all ; he may be dreaming, or, 
as anosognosic patients do, report having performed actions that he is, in fact, 
totally unable to perform. 
We have two other reasons to refrain from using the agent's introspective access 
to his own intentions to act. First, we need independently to understand what it is 
for an agent to be a person, and can hope to do so on the basis of specific properties 
of the organism's mental states. The concept of a conscious state is thus to be 
developed without presupposing the concept of a conscious agent. Although 
mental imagery could, at least in principle, be approached as a mental state in 
abstraction from the agent who entertains it, the explanatory role that imagery has 
in the development of one particular action calls forth introspection, and thus 
agent-level properties. 
Second, as neuroscientists and psychologists well know, it is always in principle 
possible to substitute a functional property for an introspective one30. This 
observation becomes all the more relevant when our analysis aims at including 
"minimal" actions, performed without any conscious imagery : a functional 
explanation should be more general than a "phenomenological" one. 
These difficulties invite an analysis of self-referentiality of action representations 
that leaves aside the conscious properties of these representations. Could not we 
                                                
29 Cf. Bach (1978). 
30  Leaving aside philosophical considerations of the "inverted spectrum type". 
See  Block (1978) on the limits of functionalism about qualia. 
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find functional properties capable of anchoring the  components of an action 
representation to  one place, one temporal episode, and one particular way of 
achieving it, i.e. identify binding properties ? A plausible  candidate would have to 
satisfy the demands of action monitoring. For any action to be performed up to its 
end, from instigation to completion, some monitoring has to take place, that 
maintains activated the representation of the goal - this particular goal - across a 
changing context, guides the feedback in the way indicated above and brings the 
process to a halt when the goal-event is reached. As a consequence, every step of 
the action is performed under the monitoring of the very plan to which it belongs. Now 
the question is : how does the brain achieve this monitoring in an ever-changing 
external context ? 
 Recent considerations on deictic binding could offer interesting perspectives for 
answering this question. A deictic representation is a representation whose content 
depends on the context of a particular informational capture. Classical examples of 
deictic representations are demonstrative expressions : this object, here, that man. 
Ostensions also function as deictic variables, whose referent is the object indicated 
by the ostension-token. Recent work by Ballard et al. (1997)  suggests that the brain 
might use deictics to represent actions. Self-referentiality of action or action 
components, independently specified by philosophers in response to the problem 
of deviant causal chains31, would thus have a litteral application at the level of the 
cerebral codes used for action monitoring.  
Reasoning in abstract functional terms, there are three types of deictic 
representations that need to be involved in any action to make it a single functional 
entity. Perception first locates where  or on which object to apply the action program. 
Working memory then maintains this rule as a context for further steps in the action. 
Finally, the motor performance relies on the variables delivered by the working 
memory to ensure proper internal feedback, and on the deictics delivered by 
current perception to get the correct external feedback. Both sources will be used to 
terminate the action. 
Crucial in the whole process is the acquisition of referents in what could be called  
a "deictic program". Vision for example can be  modeled as a "deictic pointing 
device" : the fixation point (on a certain object) constitutes the center of an external 
frame of reference, in which the action is supposed to take place (either now or 
later). Grasping an object normally involves looking at it and locating it in the outer 
world in allocentric coordinates. Other senses can also be used as deicting pointers: 
haptic manipulation, audition, (and even olfaction in many animal species) can help 
                                                
31 See in particular Searle (1983), Searle (1991) and Pacherie (1998b). 
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determine where the action should take place32. In all cases, the perceived  object is 
instrumental for  having the relevant pointer activated; the action will thus preserve 
the  pointer's content as part of its conditions of satisfaction, be it a particular  object 
, location or motor routine.  
In this model, binding action components over time depends on the successive 
activation of the relevant pointers. Some of them will be activated all along, 
keeping track dynamically of a particular location, when it comes to spatial tasks33. 
Some of them will be activated sequentially, according to prestored programs. 
Cerebrally, the  crucial information seems to be delivered by the basal ganglia; they 
code delayed reward through dopaminergic neurons, and thus allow step by step 
program sequencing (Jeannerod, 1997). Some neurons seem to be specialized in 
indicating that a previous step is terminated, others that some next step is to be 
performed34. The caudal neostriatum would provide for short-term visual 
indexes35. All these atomic, deictic operations would be under the control of the 
prefrontal cortex. Those prefrontal neurons are in effect responsible for delayed 
responses (Fuster, 1973)36 and have been shown to be involved in a form of 
mnemonic processing (Fuhanashi et al., 1989). The term of working memory is used 
to refer to all kinds of domain-specific processes "for the proper utilization of 
acquired knowledge" (Goldman-Rakic, 1991). The frontal cortex is thus taken  to be 
the cerebral structure that allows working memory to be loaded with the 
representation of the task and to constrain execution in a task-relevant way.   
 
 
Conclusion 
 
I considered three ways in which the connection between semantic and pragmatic 
representations of a single action can be tightened up. A first move consisted in 
making the feedback process, i.e. the dynamics of the relationship between both 
representational components, a central element in the definition of an action. A 
second step brought in the action-effect principle, emphasizing  the teleological 
relation of each pragmatic representation type with its external effects. A final step 
consisted in elucidating the constitutive character of demonstrative reference for 
                                                
32 Action can also be mental, and will necessitate in that case "neural pointing 
devices": cf. attention. See Ballard et al., (1997). 
33 The concept of dynamic indexicality was first explored by the philosopher 
Gareth Evans ; see Evans (1985), ch. 10 ; cf. also Pacherie (1998). 
34 See Kermadi & Joseph, (1995), quoted in Jeannerod (1997), p. 157. 
35  Caan et al., (1984), quoted in Ballard et al., (1997), p. 738. 
36 Cf. also Fuster (1995) 
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the contents of working memory states.  Did we succeed in alleviating the charge 
that deviant causal chains could disrupt not only our empirical understanding of an 
action, but also  our capacity to individuate actions, and to define what an action is ?  
A philosopher could complain that our present model tends instead to  open 
Pandora's box of deviant causal chains, for there now seems to be as many chances 
that causation goes wayward  as there are distributed codes jointly activated to 
represent and control a particular action. After all each particular deictic 
representation could be causally connected to the wrong percept or to the wrong 
internal state.  
There are three reasons not to take this worry too seriously. One is that we can - 
at least in theory - rely on our  teleological account for what  a normal effect is, 
thanks to the action-effect principle. Therefore we may  find out what the normal 
causative process should be in a family of cases belonging to a same learning 
process.  This should take care of the classes of cases of the nephew-killing-uncle 
variety. The second is that the connection of a deictic element with its referent is  a 
matter  of how the world is, and not a matter of  how the organism has been wired, 
or of how it takes the world to be. Indeed one of the interesting aspects of an 
indexical view of the structure of action is that the external world - with its past and 
present properties -  plays quite a constitutive role in the selection of action 
programs as well as  in the actual course of the action, with all its near-misses,  
anticipations and   backfirings. This view thus offers an externalist understanding of 
action, with the consequence of dispensing us with the "Cartesian-style" 
philosophical difficulties37. Third, the very number of representational levels that 
neuronal analysis has to take into account should discourage a simplified view on 
causation. If one causal link is failing, others should be able to cope with the 
situation : correcting misperceptions, reestablishing temporal sequence, trying 
again etc. This is what action is all about. 
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